![]() ![]() The term déjà vu comes from the French, literally, “already seen”. Because of the presence of déjà vu and associated phenomena in several pathologies, it seems a clinical imperative to better understand this fleeting experience. Finally, given the idea that episodic memory is a concept which is seen as aiding in generating representations of the individual in both the future and the past, it seems a logical possibility, that false feelings of familiarity and remembering can indeed produce projections into the future. Presque vu possibly, by analogy, indicates the role of subjective experiences in decision-making. Jamais vu possibly helps us understand the relationship between meaning and familiarity (and can be hypothesised as being related to the concept of semantic satiation). In the case of déjà vu, the idea is that it exposes metacognitive mechanisms at play in the interpretation of familiarity signals, and as such theories of episodic memory should be able to accommodate this infrequent experience. Our hypothesis is that these experiences are all critical for understanding how subjective states guide our cognitive processing. The “eureka” moment in problem solving, if felt when actually solving a problem, is not presque vu, as examples. déjà vu is not simply finding something familiar. Thus a defining characteristic of déjà vu and related states is that they refer to conflictual, erroneous interpretations of processing. Likewise, in presque vu, it is not that we have actually had a profound insight, but we feel that we have had a profound insight, and we know that we have not. the feeling is eventually (or perhaps immediately) known to be false. In prescience, the feeling of sensing of the future soon subsides, and the experient realises that it is not possible to have known the future, i.e. In order to conform with our proposal about conflicts between what is known and what is felt, we suggest that prescience and presque vu should refer to dissociative states. These experiences include jamais vu (defined above), presque vu, the feeling of an imminent profound insight or epiphany and prescience, the feeling of being able to predict the future, which has been proposed in the literature to be both separate from déjà vu or a part of it. The entirety of experiences related to déjà vu is less easy to define, because other terms are less often used, and there is less consensus in their definition. In the case of the tip-of-the tongue, for instance, there is a feeling of knowing experienced for currently unretrievable information. ![]() This dissociative account of such subjective experiences is inherently metacognitive: these phenomena are dissociative in that they signal the existence of a metacognitive evaluation or feeling which has become detached from the ongoing mental operation. Here we describe such phenomena as dissociative since they arguably all converge on the idea that a “feeling” or “experience” becomes dissociated from a process, as has been argued for other subjective experiences, such as the Tip-of-the-Tongue state (Schwartz & Metcalfe, Citation2011). For example, jamais vu (“never seen”) is often operationsationalised as being the reverse of déjà vu the subjective experience of unreality or unfamiliarity for a stimulus known to be familiar.ĭéjà vu has variously been described as a misattribution (captured in the quote above Schacter, Citation2002) an illusion (Jacoby & Whitehouse, Citation1989 Penfield & Perot, Citation1963) and a cognitive or “epistemic” feeling (da Sousa, Citation2009 Moulin & Souchay, Citation2014). In emphasising this dissociation we are deliberately aligning the experience with other instances where metacognitive or subjective processes become divorced from the current goals of processing. As such, déjà vu can be described as a dissociative experience, resulting from a metacognitive evaluation (the certainty) of a lower-level memory process (the familiarity). ![]() It can be described as having two critical components: an intense feeling of familiarity, and a certainty that the current moment is novel. 91)In recent years, déjà vu has become of great interest in cognition, where it is mostly seen as a memory illusion. This is hard-won knowledge with potentially vital consequences for society: misattribution can alter our lives in strange and unexpected ways. Though we know little more about déjà vu today than we did back in the days of Arnaud over a century ago, we have learned a great deal about other forms of misattribution. ![]()
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